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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
DEAN DILLER: My name is Matthew Diller. I have the honor of 
being the Dean of Fordham Law School, and I am here to welcome you 
to this evening’s program. 
It is an honor to welcome Vice Chancellor Slights as our special 
guest tonight and speaker for the 18th Annual DeStefano Lecture on 
Corporate, Securities & Financial Law.1 
Vice Chancellor Slights will present to us an after-action report 
following the landmark decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC.2 
Before we turn our attention to the Delaware corporate law, allow 
me to take a few minutes to introduce the annual DeStefano Lecture 
series. 
This year, the DeStefano Lecture is celebrating its eighteenth 
anniversary. The lecture series was established by Becker Ross in 2001 
to honor the distinguished law career of the firm’s partner, Albert 
DeStefano, who dedicated his life to the service of others. 
Mr. DeStefano, a 1947 cum laude graduate of Fordham Law, served 
as the Recent Decisions and Comments Editor of the Fordham Law 
Review.3 In 1950 he earned an LLM in taxation down the street from us 
at New York University where he served as the graduate editor of the New 
York University Tax Law Review.4 
Mr. DeStefano retired after forty-seven years of practice, having 
specialized in corporate matters including mergers and acquisitions.5 
From 1973 to 1983, he shared his expertise with Fordham Law students 
as an adjunct professor here.6 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law, 
FORDHAM U. SCH. L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/23050/public_lectures/6100/ albert 
_a_destefano_lecture_on_corporate_securities_and_financial_law [https://perma.cc/4K 
6L-52P4] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
 2. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
 3. Masthead to 16 FORDHAM L. REV. (1947). 
 4. Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law, supra 
note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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Active in numerous pro bono organizations, he served as secretary 
and trustee for the Helen Keller Services for the Blind and as trustee for 
the Cleary School for the Deaf.7 
Mr. DeStefano passed away in November 2012, and we remember 
him with great fondness. 
His granddaughter, Katherine DeStefano, is a 2013 Fordham Law 
graduate and is here with us today. Thank you so much for joining us. 
I would like to take a couple of minutes to tell you about Fordham 
Law’s business faculty and our business law programs. One of Fordham 
Law’s core strengths is business law. Our professors are counted among 
the nation’s leading faculty in corporate and securities law. 
The breadth of our faculty’s expertise and our more than one hundred 
course offerings in business law cover a wide range of critical business 
law topics: corporate governance and securities law, of course, but also 
antitrust and commercial law, compliance and financial institutions, 
entrepreneurship and intellectual property, and international and 
comparative law. 
In addition, our law clinic offers four business-oriented options 
where students gain firsthand experience helping clients with issues they 
have explored in our classrooms, including a new Entrepreneurial Law 
Clinic. 
Our Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is the number-
one most cited banking and finance journal by other law journals and 
second most cited banking and finance journal by judges.8 
We are proud of our new initiatives in corporate compliance, 
including two master’s programs, a Master of Laws for lawyers9 and a 
                                                                                                                                         
 7. Id. 
 8. According to the ranking system maintained by the Law Library at Washington 
& Lee University School of Law. See Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking, 2009–
2016, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. L., http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/87 
QV-VDQE] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018) (to replicate the search results, search “Subject: 
Banking and Finance;” then “Edit type: Student-edited;” and “Ranking Criteria: Case 
cites”). 
 9. Fordham Master of Laws in Corporate Compliance, FORDHAM U. SCH. L., 
https://www.fordham.edu/info/22606/corporate_compliance [https://perma.cc/ECB6-U 
H4D] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
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Master in the Study of Law for non-lawyers, both of which focus on 
corporate compliance.10 
Complementing all of this is the host of this evening’s program, our 
Corporate Law Center, which plays a key role in bridging the gap between 
academics and practitioners by bringing together scholars, professionals, 
policymakers, and students for discussion and study of business law and 
finance law.11 
The Center was established in 2001 by then-Dean John Feerick and 
has three areas of focus.12 
First, the Center convenes public lectures, roundtable discussions, 
expert panels, and academic symposia, including tonight’s lecture.13 
Second, the Center is a platform to showcase the business law 
scholarship of the Fordham Law faculty in a wide variety of financial 
subspecialties.14 
Third, the Center serves as a resource for Fordham Law students, 
connecting them to our distinguished alumni through the business law 
practitioner series and a variety of mentoring programs.15 
For more information about the Center, I invite you to look on the 
website.16 
I want to thank the faculty director of the Center, Professor Sean 
Griffith. Thank you for your leadership, Sean.17 
I also want to thank the Administrative Director, Vera Korzun, who 
brought us all together this evening. Vera will be leaving us at the end of 
this semester to begin a teaching post of her own at the University of 
                                                                                                                                         
 10. Fordham Master in the Study of Law, FORDHAM U. SCH. L., 
https://www.fordham.edu/info/23823/corporate_compliance [https://perma.cc/8X98-V8 
8K] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
 11. Fordham Corporate Law Center, FORDHAM U. SCH. L., 
https://www.fordham.edu/info/20691/corporate_law_center/5400/about_us [https://per 
ma.cc/3LHQ-6V48] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Sean J Griffith, FORDHAM U. SCH. L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/23142/ 
sean_j_griffith [https://perma.cc/LA54-9GPQ] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
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Akron.18 She holds an SJD from our school, and we are tremendously 
proud of her.19 
Thank you so much, Vera. 
Now it is my pleasure to introduce you to today’s speaker. 
The Honorable Joseph Slights III was sworn in as a Vice Chancellor 
of the Court of Chancery on March 28, 2016.20 Before his appointment, 
Vice Chancellor Slights was a partner in the Delaware law firm Morris 
James, where he practiced corporate and business litigation and chaired 
the firm’s Alternative Dispute Resolution practice group.21 
Before that, he served a twelve-year term as a judge on the Superior 
Court of Delaware, where, among other assignments, he was instrumental 
in forming the court’s Complex Commercial Litigation Division.22 Prior 
to his appointment to the Superior Court, Vice Chancellor Slights worked 
as a litigator at two other Delaware firms.23 
Vice Chancellor Slights received his JD from Washington & Lee 
University School of Law in 1988 and holds a bachelor’s in political 
science from James Madison University.24 
He is a member of the American Law Institute, the American Bar 
Association, and the Delaware Bar Association. He is a Fellow of the 
American Bar Foundation and Past President of the Richard S. Rodney 
Inn of Court.25 
Vice Chancellor, the floor is yours. 
   
                                                                                                                                         
 18. Vera Korzun, U. AKRON SCH. L., https://www.uakron.edu/law/faculty/directory/ 
profile.dot?u=vkorzun [https://perma.cc/8FGV-4HWW] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
 19. Samantha Mathewson, Vera Korzun Completes S.J.D. Requirements to Become 
Fourth Graduate of Program, FORDHAM L. NEWS (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://news.law.fordham.edu/blog/2016/09/16/vera-korzun-completes-s-j-d-
requirements-to-become-fourth-graduate-of-program/ [https://perma.cc/TJ3P-YR9T]. 
 20. Court of Chancery Judicial Officers – Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III, 
https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/judges.aspx [https://perma.cc/B9VW-E6S9] (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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LECTURE 
VICE CHANCELLOR SLIGHTS: Thank you. 
Good evening. Thank you, Dean, for that kind introduction. Thanks 
to all of the folks here, especially the students at Fordham Law School, 
for hosting me. We had a great roundtable before I came to be with you 
all this evening, I really enjoyed it. 
I also want to thank Professor Griffith for the kind invitation to have 
me here. Professor Korzun, you have been terrific today too, very kind 
and welcoming. It has been a great day, and I am looking forward to being 
with you all tonight. 
I am especially honored to be giving a lecture named for Albert A. 
DeStefano, who was a practitioner of corporate law; a dear friend of this 
law school, as I gather; and a lawyer who by all accounts applied his law 
training to extend a helping hand to those who needed it. I enjoyed getting 
to read a little bit about him in advance of tonight’s lecture because I 
thought that would be a good thing to do. I was inspired by the good work 
that he did. And so, it is truly an honor to give a lecture named after him. 
Before I dive into my remarks, I have to confess that I proceed with 
a little bit of trepidation. 
My younger son is completing his junior year in college. He has been 
very busy. He is trying to gear up to submit law school applications later 
this year, so I have not really had a chance to speak to him much. But we 
did speak last night. 
After he told me a little bit about what he has been up to, he asked 
what I was up to. I said that I was going to be here tonight giving a lecture. 
He asked, “What are you going to talk about?” 
I said, “Just some corporate law stuff.” 
He pressed for details, and I figured, “He is going to go to law school. 
He is a smart kid. Why not?” So, I dove in and gave him a summary. I 
told him, “I am going to talk about this case called Corwin.26 Some say it 
was just another case in a long line of stockholder ratification cases in 
Delaware.27 Others say it is the most significant decision to come out in 
the last two decades and it is going to spell the end of stockholder 
                                                                                                                                         
 26. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
 27. See, e.g., Robert S. Reder & Celine L. Feys, Delaware Rejects Claim That 
Directors Acted in Bad Faith by Selling Company Facing Activist Threat, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 34, 39 (2018) (downplaying the relevance of Corwin on future decisions). 
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litigation as we know it in Delaware, and in particular in the Court of 
Chancery.”28 
I talked to him a little bit about some of the challenges that the 
decision has presented to us as judges on the Court of Chancery. I spent 
about three minutes or so talking about that, and afterward I said, “So 
what do you think?” Silence. I said, “Are you still there?” 
He said, “Oh, my God, Dad. That sounds awful. Is it too late to tell 
them you are going to talk about something else?” 
I said, “Yes, it is a little too late for that.” 
What I now appreciate is that I have entered this phase with my adult 
son which is called the brutal honesty phase of our relationship. For some 
of you students, you may be there now with your parents—in this state of 
brutal honesty. I just want to say be gentle with your parents because you 
can really rattle them. 
What I am going to try to do is provide a not-too-awful after-action 
report, if you will, on the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in 
Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings.29 To that end, I am hoping to cover 
five points. 
I have some PowerPoint slides that I hope will serve as markers 
along the way and sort of help guide us through the discussion. 
The five points are these: 
First, I want to break down the holding. I think that is going to be a 
helpful springboard into the broader discussion that I hope we can have 
tonight about Corwin.30 
Second, I want to dwell a bit on Corwin’s origins because I think that 
background is helpful, if not necessary, to understand fully the 
significance of the decision.31 
Third, I want to discuss Corwin’s impact with regard to stockholder 
litigation, and in particular how the decision has been received among 
practitioners and commentators.32 
Fourth, I want to get into some of the practical and doctrinal 
challenges that have arisen as Corwin settles.33 
                                                                                                                                         
 28. See, e.g., Matt Chiappardi, Delaware Plaintiffs’ Bar Rattled by Seismic Shift in 
Merger Law, LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/891000/del-
plaintiffs-bar-rattled-by-seismic-shift-in-merger-law [https://perma.cc/3PB4-79UW]. 
 29. 125 A.3d 304. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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Finally, I would like to close with some thoughts about where this 
Corwin doctrine might be going and whether there really is cause for 
concern.34 
Before I get into further remarks, I need to also step back and take a 
page from my friends at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
who always remind us when they talk in public that their views are not 
the views of the Commission or anyone who works at the Commission; 
they are their own views. These views are absolutely my own views. Do 
not blame anyone else for what I am saying tonight. 
I also hope it goes without saying that judges are rarely able to be as 
provocative as they might like to be in public comments, especially as 
some of these issues are either before me or soon will be before me. So, 
in some instances, I am going to raise questions, but likely not answer 
them, at least not here. Hopefully you all can appreciate that. The 
questions themselves, I think, are provocative in their own way. 
Corwin involved a post-closing challenge to a stock-for-stock 
merger where the plaintiffs raised fiduciary duty claims against the 
target’s board and an alleged conflicted controlling stockholder.35 The 
target’s board submitted the transaction for stockholder approval, as 
required by statute, and the stockholders approved the transaction by a 
significant margin.36 
The plaintiffs argued that the standard of review that the court should 
apply was entire fairness, given the presence of a conflicted controller, 
and the defendants argued that the standard of review was the business 
judgment rule.37 
Interestingly, there was no argument, at the trial court level at least, 
that Revlon38 enhanced scrutiny might apply, although that argument was 
                                                                                                                                         
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 306. 
 36. Id. at 308. 
 37. Id. at 306, 308. 
 38. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
The Revlon decision addressed the fiduciary obligations of a Delaware corporation’s 
board of directors in connection with a sale of the company. Id. at 182. Per Revlon, once 
it becomes “apparent [to a corporation’s board of directors] that a break-up of the 
company [is] inevitable . . . [t]he duty of the board . . . change[s] from the preservation 
of [the company] as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a 
sale for the stockholders’ benefit.” Id. Following Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court 
made clear that directorial “approval of a transaction resulting in a sale of [corporate] 
control” will be subject to “enhanced [judicial] scrutiny to ensure that it is reasonable.” 
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raised in the Delaware Supreme Court, even though this was a stock-for-
stock transaction.39 
For those who might be interested in that discussion, see footnote 
twelve of the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion and page 989 of the 
Chancery opinion.40 There is actually, I think at least, a fascinating 
discussion of that issue there.41 
The Court of Chancery granted a motion to dismiss upon concluding 
that there was no controlling stockholder, and the stockholder vote 
triggered business judgment review.42 
The Supreme Court affirmed and held—and this is a bit of a 
mouthful, but we will break it down—that approval of a corporate merger 
not subject to entire fairness review by the vote of a fully informed 
uncoerced majority of the corporation’s disinterested stockholders 
invokes pleading-stage business judgment review in a post-closing 
stockholder damages action challenging the transaction.43 
In essence, the court determined that the informed uncoerced 
stockholder vote will cleanse any breaches of fiduciary duty that might 
have been alleged. 
Corwin and the trial court opinion that it affirmed are packed with 
interesting tidbits, including the Revlon44 and Unocal45 discussions that I 
just mentioned, and the court’s treatment of a rather unique controlling-
stockholder argument where the court was asked to determine that a 
minority stockholder with a one-percent stake in the target was actually a 
controlling stockholder.46 That also is worth the read in and of itself, and 
I would encourage you to take a look at the discussion there because it is, 
I think, significant in our controlling-stockholder jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                                                         
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994). This type 
of enhanced judicial scrutiny is sometimes referred to as “Revlon enhanced scrutiny.” 
 39. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 308. 
 40. Id. at 308 n.12; In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 
989 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 41. KKR, 101 A.3d at 989. 
 42. Id. at 990–91. 
 43. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 305–06. 
 44. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 45. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (holding that 
corporate board’s adoption of defensive measures in response to a perceived threat to 
corporate control is subject to enhanced judicial scrutiny). 
 46. See KKR, 101 A.3d at 991–95. 
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But for today’s purposes, what I want to focus on is the standard of 
review and why we care about that. 
We see in Corwin that the court says it is appropriate to ratchet down 
a more searching standard of review to the deferential business judgment 
review by virtue of the stockholder vote.47 
But again, why do we care? We care because, in fiduciary litigation, 
the business judgment rule is the golden egg. As Professor Bernard 
Sharfman wrote in his recent article aptly titled “The Importance of the 
Business Judgment Rule,” it is fair to say that the business judgment rule 
is the “most prominent and important standard” in all of corporate law 
because when it applies, the court is obliged to presume that director 
fiduciaries were fully informed and were acting in good faith in their 
decision-making.48 
As a practical matter, and as our Supreme Court made clear in Singh 
v. Attenborough, “[w]hen the business-judgment-rule standard of review 
is invoked because of a [stockholder] vote, dismissal is typically the 
result. That is because the vestigial waste exception has long had little 
real-world relevance because it has been understood that stockholders 
would be unlikely to approve a transaction that is wasteful.”49 That is a 
quote from Singh.50 
So, the post-vote application of the business judgment rule at the 
pleading stage almost always means that breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims 
will be dismissed before they even get out of the gate. That is why we 
care. 
Back to the holding, I want to break it down just a little bit more 
because there is a good bit in there. 
First, the court limits the reach of its holding in the case to mergers.51 
That makes perfect sense since that was the form of transaction at issue 
there. Does it apply to other types of transactions, to other transactional 
structures? Not clear from this decision. 
Next, the court makes a point of stating that the holding does not 
apply to transactions that are subject to entire fairness review.52 Corwin 
involved, as I mentioned, an alleged conflicted controlling-stockholder 
                                                                                                                                         
 47. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312. 
 48. Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule, 14 N.Y.U. 
J. L. & BUS. 27, 28–29 (2017). 
 49. 137 A.3d 151, 151-52 (Del. 2016). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 306. 
 52. Id. 
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transaction.53 If the court had agreed that the merger involved a conflicted 
controller, we know that entire fairness would have been the operative 
standard of review,54 and we know from the opinion that the court would 
not have found that the stockholder vote cleansed the alleged breaches.55 
So, Corwin does not apply to conflicted controller transactions.56 
But what about cases where entire fairness might apply as a result of 
alleged board-level conflicts? Does Corwin apply in those cases?57 Again, 
not clear. 
The court emphasizes that the stockholder vote must be fully 
informed.58 That is clear enough. But at the pleading stage, how does that 
play out? Corwin appears to embrace a stockholder ratification defense of 
sorts.59 Does the plaintiff have to plead around the defense? It appears that 
the answer to that question is yes, given that the court affirmed an order 
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim.60 But the question is 
not directly presented in the Corwin decision, so it is not directly 
answered.61 
The vote must be “uncoerced.”62 Well, what does that mean exactly? 
The court earlier says that the holding will not apply to transactions where 
entire fairness is the standard of review,63 and yet, those are typically the 
types of transactions where the court is on highest alert for coercion. So, 
what other scenarios does the court have in mind here? 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. Id. 
 54. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) 
(“[T]his Court holds that the exclusive standard of judicial review in examining the 
propriety of an interested cash-out merger transaction by a controlling or dominating 
shareholder is entire fairness.”). 
 55. See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312 (Only “[a] fully informed, uncoerced stockholder 
vote[]” will invoke pleading-stage business judgment deference.) (emphasis added); see 
also Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (“[E]ven when an interested cash-out merger transaction 
receives the informed approval of a majority of minority stockholders . . . an entire 
fairness analysis is the only proper standard of judicial review.”). 
 56. See generally Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312. 
 57. See generally id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See generally id. 
 60. Id. at 313. 
 61. See generally id. 
 62. Id. at 312. 
 63. Id. at 306 (limiting the holding to “merger[s that are] not subject to the entire 
fairness standard of review.”). 
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Then, finally, the court emphasized that the relevant vote tally must 
be comprised only of disinterested stockholders.64 Again, seems easy 
enough, but, as we will discover later, maybe not. 
So, we see in Corwin a holding that appears straightforward.65 
Whether it is really groundbreaking can be debated, and we will get to 
that. But we also can see that the holding leaves several questions 
unanswered. Why? Because the questions were not presented in the case, 
and the court did what even Delaware courts try to do, at least usually, 
and that is it answered the questions that were presented by the facts in 
that case and left other questions not presented to be decided in other cases 
where those facts would justify that decision-making. Fair enough. 
In fairly short order, in fact, other cases did come along that allowed 
our courts to answer some of these lingering questions. I do not want to 
dwell on those answers too long. They are what they are, and you can read 
those decisions. I would rather spend the time talking about questions that 
have not been answered yet. 
But let us briefly talk about the answers that we have so far. 
Does Corwin66 apply only to mergers as contemplated by Sections 
251(b) and (c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL)?67 The 
answer to that is no. We see in In re Volcano68 that the Corwin69 doctrine 
will apply to transactions where stockholders manifest their approval of 
the transaction by tendering their shares.70 In that case, it was a merger 
under Section 251(h) of the DGCL where a stockholder vote on the front 
end was not required.71 
Does Corwin72 apply to transactions where entire fairness may apply 
based only on board-level conflicts? The answer is yes.73 The reference 
                                                                                                                                         
 64. Id. at 313. 
 65. See generally id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b), (c) (2017). 
 68. In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727 (Del. Ch. 2016), aff’d, 156 
A.3d 697 (Del. 2017). 
 69. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
 70. Volcano, 143 A.3d at 738 (“I conclude that stockholder approval of a merger 
under Section 251(h) by accepting a tender offer has the same cleansing effect as a vote 
in favor of that merger.”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
 73. Larkin v. Shah, C.A. No. 10918-VCS, 2016 WL 4485447, at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
25, 2016) (“[T]he only transactions that are subject to entire fairness that cannot be 
cleansed by proper stockholder approval are those involving a controlling stockholder.”). 
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to “entire fairness” in Corwin is to cases where the standard applies ab 
initio, meaning transactions involving conflicted controlling 
stockholders.74 
This appears now, I think, to be fairly well settled in Chancery, but 
not expressly decided by our Supreme Court yet, although I think that 
holding is implicit in Corwin.75 That is what I found in Larkin,76 and I 
think other members of the court have shared that view.77 But I do want 
to come back to this issue later because I think it may be a bit more 
nuanced than it appears. But, for now, we have an answer to that question. 
Aiding and abetting: does Corwin apply to those cases?78 I think the 
answer here again is yes. I think our Supreme Court affirmed as much in 
the Singh v. Attenborough case.79 
Next is the question of whether a plaintiff bringing a post-close 
damages complaint has to plead around the Corwin defense.80 In other 
words, does the plaintiff have to plead that the stockholder vote was 
uninformed or coerced, even though structurally the defendant ultimately 
would have to prove those facts as an element of the defense in the event 
the case went beyond a Rule 12(b)(6) motion? 
The answer is yes, the plaintiff does have a pleading burden to plead 
around the Corwin defense.81 Chancellor Bouchard held in Solera that: 
it makes little sense in my view that defendants must bear this 
pleading burden for it would create an unworkable standard, putting a 
litigant in the proverbially impossible position of proving a negative . 
. . It is instead far more sensible that a plaintiff challenging the 
decision to approve a transaction must first identify a deficiency in the 
operative disclosure document, at which point the burden would fall 
                                                                                                                                         
 74. 125 A.3d at 308. 
 75. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
 76. See generally Larkin, 2016 WL 4485447. 
 77. See, e.g., In re Merge Healthcare Inc. Stockholder Litig., 
Consol. C.A. No.11388-VCG, 2017 WL 395981, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2017) 
(following Larkin). 
 78. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
 79. 137 A.3d 151, 153 (Del. 2016) (“Having correctly decided . . . that the 
stockholder vote was fully informed and voluntary, the Court of Chancery properly 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against all parties [including the board’s financial 
advisor].”). 
 80. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
 81. See generally id. 
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to defendants to establish that the alleged deficiency fails as a matter 
of law in order to secure the cleansing effect of the vote.82 
So, we now know that Corwin does impose a heightened pleading 
burden on the plaintiff in the sense that the plaintiff must affirmatively 
plead around what is generally regarded otherwise as an affirmative 
defense.83 I will not say that is unique because I do not know that is so. 
But it is remarkable that, in an affirmative pleading, the plaintiff has that 
burden to plead around an affirmative defense. 
What about coercion? Some guidance has emerged on what is meant 
by “coercion” in the Corwin context.84 The notion of inherent coercion is 
confined to transactions involving conflicted controlling stockholders—
not a terribly novel proposition. In the Pure Resources case, I think then-
Vice Chancellor Strine made that point, that those transactions are 
uniquely and inherently coercive.85 I think Vice Chancellor Glasscock has 
also reiterated that point.86 Vice Chancellor Glasscock also discussed 
structural coercion in the Sciabacucchi case.87 
I have to digress for a moment. I actually had Mr. Sciabacucchi as a 
lead plaintiff in a case that I had, and his name was pronounced six 
different ways during the course of the oral argument. It was sort of like 
Daubert88—is it “Dow-burt,” “Dough-bair”? Nobody quite could get that 
pronunciation down. I think Mr. Sciabacucchi, who is, I am sure, a lovely 
man, has his name routinely butchered in our courts. I think that is wrong, 
and we should learn how to pronounce it. But in the meantime, we will 
                                                                                                                                         
 82. In re Solera Holdings, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11524–CB, 2017 WL 
57839, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2017). 
 83. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
 84. Id. 
 85. In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 436 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(explaining the “‘inherent coercion’ that exists when a controlling stockholder announces 
its desire to buy the minority’s shares,” and likening a controlling stockholder so situated 
to a “800–pound gorilla whose urgent hunger for the rest of the bananas is likely to 
frighten less powerful primates like putatively independent directors . . . [and] minority 
stockholders, [who] would fear retribution from the gorilla if they defeated the merger 
and he did not get his way”). 
 86. See Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., C.A. No. 11418–VCG, 2017 WL 
2352152, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017). 
 87. Id. at *20 (“In the Corwin context, a structurally-coerced vote is simply a vote 
structured so that considerations extraneous to the transaction likely influenced the 
stockholder-voters, so that [the court] cannot determine that the vote represents a 
stockholder decision that the challenged transaction is in the corporate interest.”). 
 88. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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call that case the Liberty case because I think that is what it is more 
commonly referred to as. 
In the Liberty case, Vice Chancellor Glasscock explained that this 
strain of coercion—structural coercion—occurs when the board 
structures the vote in a manner that requires stockholders to base their 
decisions on reasons extraneous to the economic merits of the transaction 
at issue.89 
In the Massey case, Chancellor Bouchard explained that when a 
board tries to pack too much into a vote, that dynamic can also create a 
structurally coercive vote.90 I want to come back to this idea of vote 
packing in a moment. 
Situational coercion can arise where the board, by its conduct, 
creates a situation where stockholders are being asked to tender shares in 
ignorance or a mistaken belief as to the value of their shares. 
In the Saba case, the target company’s stockholders were given a 
choice between keeping their recently deregistered illiquid stock, which 
was a circumstance created by the board’s own failures, or accepting 
substantially deflated merger consideration.91 I found that these 
circumstances created situational coercion since the board had “[f]oisted 
a Hobson’s choice upon the stockholders” by insisting on selling the 
company “in the midst of [its] regulatory chaos.”92 That was a quote from 
that decision. 
What we have seen in these cases is that, as the facts are presented, 
the court is given opportunities to answer some of the unanswered 
questions that were left after Corwin was decided.93 But, as we will 
discuss in a moment, there are still more to be answered. I want to get to 
those shortly. 
Before I discuss reactions that we have seen to Corwin—and I think 
that is an important discussion to have—I do want to very briefly cover 
                                                                                                                                         
 89. Sciabacucchi, 2017 WL 2352152, at *15, *20. 
 90. In re Massey Energy Co. Deriv. & Class Action Litig., 160 A.3d 484, 508 (Del. 
Ch. 2017) (“[I]n order to invoke the cleansing effect of a stockholder vote under Corwin, 
there logically must be a . . . proximate relationship . . . between the transaction or issue 
for which stockholder approval is sought and the nature of the claims to be ‘cleansed’ as 
a result of a fully-informed vote.”). 
 91. In re Saba Software, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 10697–VCS, 2017 WL 
1201108, at *15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2017), as revised (Apr. 11, 2017). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
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where Corwin came from.94 I think that discussion of history is useful to 
understand the differences in view and the differences in the way in which 
folks have reacted to the decision. 
Corwin is, as I have mentioned, an outgrowth of the doctrine of 
stockholder ratification which, as we know from Gantler v. Stephens,95 
assigns certain legal consequences to fully informed, uncoerced approval 
of a corporate transaction by a majority of the corporation’s disinterested 
stockholders, provided that the DGCL does not require stockholder 
approval for the transaction to become effective.96 That was the state of 
ratification law, at least post-Gantler.97 
A long line of pre-Corwin case law addresses how the doctrine 
operates and its conceptual underpinnings.98 In fact, the now-famous 
footnote nineteen in Corwin99 traces stockholder ratification as far back 
as 1928 with the Chancery’s opinion in the MacFarlane v. North 
American Cement Corporation100 case. So, we have a long history here 
for sure. 
What I want to emphasize about the history is that the notion that 
stockholders can ratify less-than-perfect decisions made by corporate 
fiduciaries is well-embedded in our law, not new. The idea that 
stockholder ratification can and should ratchet down the level of judicial 
scrutiny paid to fiduciary decision-making—also not new. 
In this regard, I suppose it is important that the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Corwin reiterated that when stockholders determine with their 
votes that a transaction is a “fair exchange,” it is appropriate that our 
courts not substitute their own business judgment for that exercise in good 
faith by the stockholders.101 Important to reiterate that concept, no doubt. 
                                                                                                                                         
 94. See generally id. 
 95. 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 96. See generally Corwin, 125 A.3d 304. 
 97. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Zuckerberg, 124 A.3d 47, 62 (Del. Ch. 2015) (applying the 
holding in Gantler that the shareholder ratification doctrine is limited to circumstances 
in which a fully informed shareholder vote approves director action that does not require 
shareholder approval to become legally effective). 
 98. See Matteo Gatti, Reconsidering the Merger Process: Approval Patterns, 
Timelines, and Shareholders’ Role, 69 HASTINGS L. J. 835, 849 (citing Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) in support of the argument that 
shareholder decision-making has been at the forefront of Delaware case law for many 
years). 
 99. 125 A.3d 304, 310 n. 19. 
 100. 157 A. 396 (Del. Ch. 1928). 
 101. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 313–14. 
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It also could be deemed important that the court reiterated, in a rare 
moment of judicial self-awareness—and I say that referring to all judges, 
who as a breed are generally not self-aware—but in this instance self-
awareness carried the day because the court recognized that, as a general 
matter, judges are poorly positioned to evaluate the wisdom of business 
decisions and that there is little utility to having them second guess the 
determination of impartial decision-makers with an actual economic stake 
in the outcome—namely, the corporation’s stockholders.102 
These are important statements of doctrine, but they are not new, as 
evidenced by the decision’s ample footnotes. 
As a functional matter, Corwin is significant in the development of 
our ratification law only because it made clear that the doctrine of 
stockholder ratification does extend to corporate transactions where 
stockholder approval is required for the deal to be effective.103 That was 
not clear under Gantler;104 it was made clear in Corwin.105 
But here again, even on this point, the decision is not terribly 
remarkable because, I think, frankly, it was quite predictable, as the 
Chancellor, I think, made clear in his trial court opinion.106 
Indeed, because these are not new pronouncements, it is not at all 
surprising that some commentators push back on the notion that Corwin 
was really groundbreaking at all.107 
So, what is the big deal? There was more. There was more. I have 
already alluded to this, but it is important to reiterate. This is why we, I 
think, talk about Corwin.108 Corwin calls for pleading-stage business 
judgment deference, and it requires dismissal of post-closing stockholder 
litigation challenges to stockholder-ratified transactions.109 
Again, as the Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized, “[w]hen the 
business judgment rule standard of review is invoked because of a 
                                                                                                                                         
 102. Id. 
 103. See generally id. 
 104. See generally Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 105. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
 106. See generally In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980 (Del. 
Ch. 2014). 
 107. See, e.g., Edward B. Micheletti, et al., M&A Litigation Developments: Where Do 
We Go From Here?, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (May 29, 2018), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/05/insights-the-delaware-
edition/ma-litigation-developments [https://perma.cc/7XVG-TLSE]. 
 108. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
 109. See generally id. 
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[stockholder] vote, dismissal is typically the result.”110 That direction, I 
think, is loud and clear, and it is not equivocal. Again, the case is not 
going to get off the starting line. 
So what is this “Corwin effect” and how has it been received? Here 
are just a few of the representative articles that came out post-Corwin. 
“Is Stockholder Litigation in Trouble in Delaware? An Update.”111 
That was published just a few weeks ago. 
“Delaware Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Fear Exodus of Chancery Deal 
Suits.”112 
“As Deals Bloom, Delaware Judges Are Leaving Shareholders Bar 
in the Cold.”113 “In the cold”!—that is pretty dramatic. 
“Delaware Supreme Court Deals Another Blow to Stockholder 
Plaintiffs in M&A Litigation.”114 
“Delaware Plaintiffs’ Bar Rattled by Seismic Shift in Merger 
Law.”115 That I very much doubt. The stockholder plaintiffs’ bar does not 
easily rattle, in my experience. I mean that entirely as a compliment. 
So, not a terribly warm reception out there. Now, I will confess that 
there are some articles that take the other point of view, but these are the 
ones that grab our attention. 
As was mentioned in the introduction, I joined the Court of Chancery 
in March 2016.116 Corwin was decided in October 2015.117 When I 
submitted my application to join the court, right around October 2015, I 
                                                                                                                                         
 110. Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151-52 (Del. 2016). 
 111. Edward M. McNally, Is Stockholder Litigation in Trouble in Delaware? An 
Update, DEL. BUS. CT. INSIDER (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.law.com/delbizcourt/2018/ 
03/21/is-stockholder-litigation-in-trouble-in-delaware-an-update/ [https://perma.cc/ 
G8RQ-5GTL]. 
 112. Matt Chiappardi, Delaware Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Fear Exodus of Chancery Deal 
Suits, LAW360 (May 19, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/926199/del-plaintiffs-
attys-fear-exodus-of-chancery-deal-suits [https://perma.cc/EG44-Q5X3]. 
 113. Alison Frankel, As Deals Boom, Delaware Judges Are Leaving Shareholders’ 
Bar in the Cold, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2016), http://reut.rs/2fa2Ylu [https://perma.cc/NNT3-
PGLL]. 
 114. Bradley R. Aronstam & S. Michael Sirkin, Singh v. Attenborough: Delaware 
Supreme Court Deals Another Blow to Stockholder Plaintiffs in M&A Litigation, 20 
M&A LAW. 5 (2016). 
 115. Matt Chiappardi, supra note 28. 
 116. Court of Chancery Judicial Officers – Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III, 
supra note 20. 
 117. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
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thought that our law and stockholder litigation was pretty well settled for 
the most part. 
Had I known that I would join the court and would immediately 
thereafter bear witness to the brutal slaying of stockholder litigation in 
Delaware as we know it and, worse, that I would be asked to pick up a 
club and start beating the cases over the head (of course, I jest), I might 
have thought twice about my timing, because it does seem to be a time 
when the court is very much under the microscope. But as I will mention 
later in my remarks, I think it is one of the coolest times to be a judge on 
the court. 
But to be sure, in all seriousness, the Corwin stakes are very high.118 
For starters, as we discussed, the Corwin case does, in my view—and I 
think it would be hard to debate—impose a heightened pleading burden 
on stockholder plaintiffs in post-closing fiduciary duty litigation.119 
But that burden is made all the more onerous by recent Delaware 
decisions that limit the stockholder plaintiffs’ ability to obtain expedited 
pre-closing discovery. Take, for instance, the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
2014 decision in C&J Energy Services, Inc.120 There, the court made clear 
that the Court of Chancery should not preliminarily enjoin the completion 
of a pending merger based on alleged flaws in the deal process “where no 
rival bidder has emerged to complain that it was not given a fair 
opportunity to bid, and where there is no reason to believe that 
stockholders are not adequately informed or will be coerced into 
accepting the transaction if they do not find it favorable.”121 
Leaders in our stockholder plaintiffs’ bar have observed that, in 
practice, C&J eliminates “a basis for seeking expedit[ed pre-closing] 
discovery.”122 That is a quote from Joel Friedlander’s very thoughtful 
article discussing this dynamic, titled “Vindicating the Duty of 
Loyalty.”123 
Also significant in the post-Corwin litigation landscape is the Court 
of Chancery’s 2016 decision in In re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litigation.124 
                                                                                                                                         
 118. See generally id. 
 119. See generally id. 
 120. C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation Emps.’ Ret. 
Tr., 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014). 
 121. Id. at 1072–73. 
 122. Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty, 72 BUS. LAW. 623, 643 
(2017). 
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 124. 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
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Chancellor Bouchard, who authored that decision, discussed it at length, 
I gather, in his DeStefano Lecture two years ago.125 
There is not time to dissect that decision here tonight. Suffice it to 
say, it marked the end, for practical purposes, of disclosure-only 
settlements with broad releases, at least in the Delaware Court of 
Chancery.126 
Again, as a practical matter, the end of disclosure-only settlements 
meant the end of expedited discovery that was routinely taken in aid of 
those settlements. So, without discovery in either of those contexts, it is 
surely more difficult to plead a Corwin-worthy complaint. 
From the perspective of stockholder plaintiffs and their attorneys, 
these developments are unfortunate and troubling. The concern, as it 
relates to Corwin, is that the inability to meet the heightened Corwin 
pleading standard means that “potentially meritorious damages claims for 
breach of the duty of loyalty or aiding and abetting will either be 
dismissed or they will not be filed [in the first place]”127—at least not in 
Delaware. That is another quote from the Friedlander article, where I 
think that concern is very clearly articulated.128 
Friedlander goes on to identify several of the seminal recoveries 
achieved by plaintiffs in post-closing stockholder litigation and, I think 
legitimately, questions whether those results could have been achieved in 
a post-Corwin environment.129 
Beyond the litigator’s perspective of the Corwin effect, I think there 
are some concerns that you will hear from deal lawyers, at least under 
Chatham House Rules, and perhaps more freely articulated by judges. 
First and foremost, after Corwin, there are fewer opportunities for 
Delaware courts to evaluate and opine on the propriety, or lack thereof, 
of corporate fiduciaries’ deal-related conduct. This is notable insofar as a 
number of landmark Delaware corporate law cases have a particular 
didactic quality to them, in that they address the conduct of corporate 
directors, officers, or advisors in connection with a particular transaction 
or structure of a transaction and then convey some message to the effect 
                                                                                                                                         
 125. See Andre G. Bouchard, Disclosure Settlements–Before and After Trulia, 22 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 4 (2017). 
 126. See generally In re Trulia, 129 A.3d 884. 
 127. Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty, 72 BUS. LAW. at 645. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 646–48. 
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of “do this” or “do not do this,”130 sometimes explicitly, other times 
implicitly. 
Former Chancellor Chandler, who is a personal hero of mine, 
referred to Delaware corporate law decisions as parables that counselors 
could take with them into the boardroom as support for the often tough 
advice they were having to give their clients. After Corwin, however, 
there are fewer opportunities for our courts to offer such parables to 
corporate counselors. 
Insofar as questionable board conduct may now be cleansed by a 
Corwin-compliant stockholder vote, judicial discussion of the propriety 
of Corwin-cleansed board conduct in a given case is essentially hortatory 
in nature. Query, then, whether judicial commentary on the propriety of 
Corwin-cleansed board conduct is appropriate at all. While the Court of 
Chancery is a court of equity, there is a difference between adjudicating 
a dispute based on equitable principles and idle moralizing for the sake of 
hearing oneself speak. 
The other concern is one that I think we as judges have to confess we 
do not fully appreciate. Not a single member of the Court of Chancery, 
and I think only one member of our Supreme Court, was actually in 
practice when the effects of Corwin were felt in the boardrooms.131 But I 
gather the effects are palpable. 
It is, perhaps, harder to sell “do the right thing” advice when the 
prospect of injunctive relief or post-close damages is more remote. It is 
harder to bargain away deal protections from the sell side when the data 
tells us that jumping bidders are not regularly surfacing, and it has been a 
while since our courts have had an opportunity to weigh in on the 
propriety of deal protections or even, for that matter, deal processes more 
generally. Has Corwin given bidders more negotiating leverage?132 
                                                                                                                                         
 130. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) 
(holding that a board’s conduct in decision-making in the absence of an abuse of 
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Then, of course, there is the impact on litigation activity. Here is 
what we know. Following Corwin, C&J, and Trulia—and we should 
probably throw the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in M&F 
Worldwide Corporation (“MFW”)133 into the mix—there has been a 
decline in merger litigation in the Court of Chancery. I draw this data from 
a terrific article published last year by Professors Fisch, Solomon, and 
Thomas, and Matthew Cain from the SEC, titled “The Shifting Tides of 
Merger Litigation.”134 
The data in Table 1 is widely publicized by now. It speaks for itself, 
and I am not going to dwell too long on it here. Filings are down, and the 
temporal relationship of this phenomena to Trulia, Corwin, MFW, and 
C&J is likely not a coincidence. 
 
Table 1: Merger Litigation Filings by Deal Completion Year 
 
Year 
Percentage of all deals 
challenged in at least one 
shareholder lawsuit 
Percentage of all deals 
challenged in a Delaware-
filed shareholder lawsuit 
2013 96% 52% 
2014 91% 55% 
2015 89% 60% 
2016 73% 34% 
2017 
(first ten 
months) 
85% 9% 
 
While the filing numbers are down, I will say that the cases are still 
coming. I always have at least a handful under submission for decision, 
and I will confess that they are generally the most challenging and the 
most interesting cases that I have on my docket. I would be lying if I did 
not admit that I would not mind a little more of the deal litigation in the 
mix of cases I get to decide. 
With that said, I think it is important to note that the court is certainly 
as busy as it has ever been, and the numbers bear that out. It is just now a 
different kind of busy. 
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Before I leave the filing trends, I think it is worth raising the question 
of whether, given the internal affairs doctrine, the change in filing patterns 
reflected in the data means that stockholder plaintiffs are actually 
avoiding Corwin when they file outside of Delaware, at least in other state 
courts.135 
On the other hand, there is, of course, always looming the question 
of how our federal courts will address matters of state corporate law, 
including Corwin. But that is a subject very much for another day, and 
absolutely for another speaker. So, I leave it at that. 
Let me turn now away from the reception of Corwin to some of the 
challenges. 
There are six challenges I want to talk to you about. One is what I 
am going to call the post-closing disclosure dilemma. The next is the 
disinterested stockholder question. The third is what I will refer to as the 
larger proxies problem. The fourth is the difficulty of working through 
disclosures at the pleading stage. Fifth, I will talk to you a little bit about 
controlling stockholder issues. Lastly, where are we now on Revlon and 
Unocal in this post-Corwin world? 
I will confess that I am going to raise lots of questions. I will offer 
very few answers. I am not sure how meaningful that will be to you, but 
I think some of these questions are some you maybe have not thought that 
much about. 
The first is the post-closing disclosure dilemma. Here is the scenario: 
A corporation’s board of directors authorizes a corporate transaction 
and recommends that the corporation’s stockholders vote to approve the 
transaction. Assume there is no controlling stockholder. The board’s 
disclosures to stockholders concerning the transaction omit or misstate 
one or more material facts. A stockholder, say Investor X, discovers the 
disclosure violations prior to the stockholder vote on the transaction, but 
does not undertake to remedy them before the stockholder vote because 
he fears that the board will try to correct the disclosures and moot his 
claim. 
The stockholder vote to approve the transaction occurs and approval 
is overwhelming. Investor X then brings a post-closing breach of 
fiduciary duty action against the directors, seeking to recover damages, 
and pleads either that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by 
failing to fully and fairly disclose to stockholders all material transaction-
related information before the vote on the transaction, or that the directors 
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breached their fiduciary duties by authorizing the transaction following a 
bad deal process, but then raises the disclosure allegations as a means to 
demonstrate, at the pleading stage, that Corwin does not apply because 
the vote approving the transaction was not fully informed. 
In either circumstance, the plaintiff is likely to face the post-closing 
disclosure dilemma. Specifically, if Investor X asserts the disclosure 
violations as an affirmative claim, the defendants will likely argue that 
the claim should be barred by laches because it was not asserted pre-vote. 
If the disclosure violations are asserted, not as an affirmative claim 
but as a basis to avoid Corwin, then the defendants will argue that the 
plaintiff should be estopped from pressing an inadequate disclosure 
argument, again because he deliberately chose not to bring a disclosure 
claim when it counted, before the stockholders were asked to vote on the 
transaction. 
Defendants might also question Investor X’s fitness to serve as a 
class representative because he kept important information from the other 
members of the putative class when they needed it most. 
But we know that Investor X kept his disclosure claims in his pocket 
for a reason. He knew if he put them on the table before the vote, the board 
would issue corrective disclosures and potentially moot the claim. He 
needs the disclosures to plead around the Corwin defense that he knows 
is coming. Hence the dilemma. 
On one hand, allowing post-closing disclosure challenges by 
stockholder plaintiffs such as Investor X arguably encourages and 
possibly rewards litigation gamesmanship by stockholder plaintiffs and 
their attorneys. 
On the other hand, this strategy may well be justifiable on a net value 
basis. Is the class better served by a successful post-close damages 
recovery that exposes bad behavior than by a pre-close disclosure fix that 
invokes Corwin cleansing? 
I am not going to try to answer that question because it has been 
before me before, and is likely going to come before me again. It is before 
my colleagues now. It is an issue that is being raised regularly and I 
suspect at some point will be decided, probably not too far off. My 
purpose now is to just raise the question. 
While we are on disclosure claims—we talked about this at the 
roundtable earlier—what do those really look like post-closing? What 
does an affirmative disclosure claim that gets through a Corwin defense 
become once you are in litigation? 
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Sure, it might have been material to disclose why the chairman of a 
selling board abstained from voting to approve a sale of the corporation,136 
but if you are actually pressing that as an affirmative claim, how do you 
do that? What does it look like at trial? Quasi-appraisal?137 And what do 
you recover for that if that is all that there is left? 
I do not know the answer to those questions. They are ones I have 
not had to confront yet but suspect that I will. 
Another question that, for now, will remain unanswered is what 
votes to count in the disinterested stockholder tally. In the Tesla case that 
I just decided, I noted in a footnote that the plaintiffs had pled in their 
complaint that a large block of the Tesla stockholders that voted for the 
merger actually held stock, perhaps substantial stock, in the target 
company that Tesla acquired.138 
The question was raised: should the votes of those stockholders 
count when the court is determining whether a majority of the 
disinterested stockholders voted to approve the transactions when the 
stockholders may have had a stake in, and therefore may have been 
interested in, that transaction? 
The plaintiffs in the Tesla case said, “No, those votes should not 
count.”139 I ultimately did not have to reach that issue, at least at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage. I am told that the issue has been raised in other 
cases now, so it is an issue that is percolating. 
We also have what I refer to as a larger proxies problem. Maybe it is 
just a problem for me because I have had to read a lot of proxies since I 
have taken this job in connection with public M&A transactions. I just 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. See Appel v. Berkman, 180 A.3d 1055, 1057–58 (Del. 2018) (so holding). 
 137. See In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 42 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(“[Q]uasi-appraisal damages are available . . . when a [corporate] fiduciary breaches its 
duty of disclosure in connection with a transaction that requires a stockholder vote. The 
premise for the award is that without the disclosure of false or misleading information, 
or the failure to disclose material information, stockholders could have voted down the 
transaction and retained their proportionate share of the equity in the corporation as a 
going concern. Quasi-appraisal damages serve as a monetary substitute for the 
proportionate share of the equity that the stockholders otherwise would have retained.”); 
id. at 53 (“In my view, in an appropriate case Delaware law continues to recognize the 
possibility of a post-closing award of damages as a remedy for a breach of the fiduciary 
duty of disclosure.”). 
 138. In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 121711-VCS, 2018 WL 
1560293, at *9 n.183 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018). 
 139. Id. 
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have to tell you that they are really dense. There is a lot in them, they are 
heavily lawyered, and, at times, they are a challenge to get through. 
Given that a Corwin-compliant stockholder approval of a transaction 
results in pleading-stage business judgment deference, there is a concern 
certainly that has been expressed that Corwin may incentivize directors 
to overwhelm stockholders with proxy disclosures concerning the 
transaction, and the process that led to the transaction, before the 
stockholders vote on it.140 In that case, stockholder “yes” votes may not 
in fact reflect that stockholders have “decided that the transaction is a fair 
exchange,” borrowing from the language in Harbor Finance.141 Absent 
that decision, there is no basis for Corwin cleansing. Again, this notion of 
packing information into a proxy and then asking for a vote is a concern, 
and it is one I want to address again later. 
Further on the disclosure point, I suspect we may well see—if we 
have not already—arguments that certain matters that were never thought 
to be material may be material now in the post-Corwin world. For 
instance, what about disclosures about Corwin itself? Does the board have 
to disclose to stockholders what their yes vote means with regard to post-
close challenges to the transaction? Is there more or different disclosure 
required about appraisal rights in the wake of recent developments? 
An informed vote is a prima facie element of a Corwin defense, 
therefore I think we can expect to see more and more creative disclosure 
arguments as the doctrine evolves—”devolves,” I almost said. Freudian. 
What I will say too about disclosure claims is that they are 
challenging to decide at the pleading stage, and they are challenging to 
decide in a post-close environment where the deal is done, and probably 
challenging to argue in that environment as well. 
I think, at least anecdotally, we seem to be seeing more complaints 
where plaintiffs are alleging that a minority block holder is a controlling 
stockholder, perhaps as a means to avoid the Corwin analysis ab initio.142 
This causes our Corwin jurisprudence, at least from my observation, 
to take on a certain predictable cadence. We cannot get to the Corwin 
                                                                                                                                         
 140. See Robert S. Reder & Victoria L. Romvary, Delaware Court Determines 
Corwin Not Available to “Cleanse” Alleged Director Misconduct, 71 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 131, 141-42 (2018) (discussing In re Massey to raise concerns regarding proxy 
disclosures and whether disclosures of certain transactions before a stockholder vote are 
“integral transactions” requiring disclosure or are extraneous information simply inserted 
to “strong-arm a favorable vote.”). 
 141. Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 901 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 142. See generally Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
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defense until we decide whether there is a conflicted controller. If not, we 
go to Corwin. If Corwin does not apply, then we turn to 102(b)(7) and 
Cornerstone.143 You walk through this cadence in each case. 
I am not saying that is a bad thing. I am not saying it is a good thing. 
I am just saying it is happening. We are seeing that flow occur in nearly 
every motion to dismiss that we are deciding. 
Last but not least, where do Revlon and Unocal stand post-Corwin? 
That is a lecture that is itself probably worthy of an hour’s discussion. 
Corwin tells us that these are “not tools designed with post-closing 
money damages in mind.”144 That was, I think, a thoughtful observation, 
but tell that to the folks involved in the Rural/Metro case.145 I think that 
would be news to them. 
But, in any event, what I will say at this point is that the Supreme 
Court’s recent order just last month in the Kahn v. Stern case can be read 
to indicate that the court still does see a role for Revlon to play in a post-
close damages action.146 
Right now, I think we just have to see how this plays out. A few cases 
have gone beyond Corwin, have broken through that defense, and we have 
to see—we had some discussion of this in the roundtable earlier—what 
are the burdens, what are the standards that are going to apply, and what 
are those cases going to look like as they approach trial? I think that is a 
stay-tuned question. 
                                                                                                                                         
 143. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2015). See also In re Cornerstone Therapeutics 
Inc., Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1175 (Del. 2015) (holding that “[a stockholder] 
plaintiff seeking only monetary damages must plead non-exculpated claims against a 
director who is protected by an exculpatory charter provision to survive a motion to 
dismiss, regardless of the underlying standard of review for the board’s conduct . . . ”). 
 144. 125 A.3d at 312. 
 145. In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del Ch. 2014) (holding 
that selling board’s financial advisor was liable to the corporation’s stockholders in 
damages for aiding and abetting the board’s breach of fiduciary duty in connection with 
a sale of the company); In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholder Litig., 102 A.3d 205 (Del. 
Ch. 2014) (assessing damages against the board’s financial advisor in an amount equal 
to 124% of the deal price). 
 146. Kahn v. Stern, 183 A.3d 715 (Del. 2018) (Table) (“To the extent . . . that the 
Court of Chancery’s decision suggests that it is an invariable requirement that a plaintiff 
plead facts suggesting that a majority of the board committed a non-exculpated breach of 
its fiduciary duties in cases where Revlon duties are applicable, but the transaction has 
closed and the plaintiff seeks post-closing damages, we disagree with that statement.”). 
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As for Unocal, the Chancellor in the Paramount Gold & Silver Corp. 
Stockholder Litigation147 case did not have to reach the question of 
whether Unocal would continue to apply to a review of defensive actions 
notwithstanding fully informed and uncoerced approval of the transaction 
by stockholders. In other words, in my view at least, the question of 
whether Corwin would cleanse a defensive action that otherwise might be 
found to be unreasonable under Unocal review remains unanswered. 
So, there are many interesting issues and challenges to confront 
going forward as we grapple with Corwin and its application. I am quite 
certain there are more than I have just identified. 
What, then, is the Corwin after-action report—I am not quite sure 
why I came up with that title, but I am going with it—at least according 
to Slights? Not that it matters, but I do personally think that Corwin was 
correct as a matter of law and as a matter of doctrine.148 
Vice Chancellor Laster explained the doctrinal rationale most 
clearly, in my view, in his 2014 pre-Corwin article entitled “The Effect of 
Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny,”149 which is a mandatory 
read for all of my law clerks and, I think, for law students to get some 
handle on the shifting standards of review. This is an excellent article for 
that too. 
What Vice Chancellor Laster tells us is that stockholders are 
“qualified decision makers.”150 And that is what we are looking for in our 
analysis of the sort of in-the-rearview-mirror transactions: who decided 
these questions? 
When the decision-makers on the front line, the board of directors, 
are disqualified by conflict or otherwise, it is appropriate to defer next to 
a decision-maker with skin in the game before the court steps in and 
assumes that role. I think Vice Chancellor Laster explains the rationale 
for that very clearly.151 Stockholders are those qualified decision-makers. 
But given the pleading-stage deference that is at stake, the key, as in 
most things, is to apply the Corwin doctrine carefully and thoughtfully.152 
                                                                                                                                         
 147. In re Paramount Gold & Silver Corp. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 10499–CB, 
2017 WL 1372659 (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2017). 
 148. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
 149. J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443 (2014). 
 150. Id. at 1459, 1466. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
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Chancellor Bouchard aptly observed that Corwin is not the great eraser.153 
We have to be careful that we apply the doctrine as intended and that 
egregious loyalty breaches do not get swept away with the stockholder 
vote. 
We also have to appreciate the pleading challenges created by 
Corwin,154 and we have to be faithful to the reasonably conceivable 
standard embedded in our Rule 12(b)(6).155 
I have always wondered what the opposite of “reasonably 
conceivable” is. Is it delusional? These are the things that keep me up at 
night. “Reasonably conceivable” is just—it is a Delaware thing. That is 
all I can say. But we do have to wrestle with the standard, try to 
understand it, and apply it in a thoughtful way. 
Can Section 220 inspections aid plaintiffs in meeting the pleading 
burden?156 I think yes, at least to some extent. However, as a court, we 
have to be mindful of timing issues, and we have to be willing to expedite 
220 matters to meet the deal timeline. Of course, plaintiffs have to file on 
time. I know that is easier said than done. 
Then when they do file, the plaintiffs are still going to have to state 
a proper purpose for inspection, which can be a challenge in the midst of 
an unfolding transaction.157 They are going to have to be precise in what 
they are asking for.158 The fact of the matter is 220 inspection is more 
limited than full-blown discovery.159 That standard will remain. That 
standard has to remain, just as the “proper purpose” standard must remain. 
                                                                                                                                         
 153. In re Massey Energy Co. Deriv. & Class Action Litig., 160 A.3d 484, 507 (Del. 
Ch. 2017) (“The policy underlying Corwin, to my mind, was never intended to serve as 
a massive eraser, exonerating corporate fiduciaries for any and all of their actions or 
inactions preceding their decision to undertake a transaction for which stockholder 
approval is obtained.”). 
 154. See generally 125 A.3d 304. 
 155. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 156. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2010). 
 157. Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 121 (Del. 2006) (“In a 
[S]ection 220 action, a stockholder has the burden of proof to demonstrate a proper 
purpose [for inspection] by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 158. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000) (“[Stockholder] plaintiffs 
may [obtain] relevant books and records of the corporation under Section 220 of the 
[DGCL], if they can ultimately bear the burden of showing a proper purpose and make 
specific and discrete identification, with rifled precision, of the documents sought.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 159. See Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 570 (Del. 
1997) (“The scope of the production which the [trial court] ordered in this case is more 
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But I do see a role for 220 to play to assist plaintiffs in pleading a 
better complaint, one that perhaps is more Corwin-compliant. 
Lastly, I think we have to pay attention to the “Corwin effect.”160 
Some have suggested that we rethink the stockholder yes vote, the so-
called two-box solution: ask stockholders to check one box for approval 
of the deal process, one box for deal price, or perhaps several boxes for 
deal process. 
Others, including myself and some other members of the court, have 
taken a slightly different view on the vote. One vote is fine. It is certainly 
far more practical. But do not pack too much into that vote. 
How much is too much will be a case-specific inquiry for sure, but 
the court should always be mindful of that concern and should not shy 
away from calling foul when a board piles on in its disclosures. There gets 
to be a point where there are so many aspects of a deal process that are 
off the rails where you cannot say that a yes vote approved all of it. Is it 
coercion? Is it not fully informed? Again, those are questions that have 
yet to be answered. But there is only so far that the assumption that a yes 
vote means yes to everything can take us. 
Our courts have not fully hashed out the concepts of situational and 
structural coercion. In these doctrinal spaces, I do think there is room for 
creative pleading. I think going forward, we are going to see cases that 
add some flavor or contour to the situational and structural coercion 
analysis. 
Vice Chancellor Glasscock has spoken about this publicly and 
eloquently, so I do not want to steal his thunder, but he does see that as 
an area where the Corwin law is going to develop perhaps most rapidly. 
Bottom line, Corwin is very much a work in progress. That is one of 
the many reasons that, in my view at least, it is a pretty cool time to be a 
judge on the Court of Chancery. As I approach my thirtieth year as a 
Delaware lawyer, which is just mind-blowing to me, I can tell you this is 
the best job I have ever had. 
With that, I thank you for listening. I think we have some time for 
questions, I hope, and I definitely encourage them—and more than 
                                                                                                                                         
akin to a comprehensive discovery order under Court of Chancery Rule 34 than a Section 
220 order. The two procedures are not the same and should not be confused. A Section 
220 proceeding should result in an order circumscribed with rifled precision.”); Khanna 
v. Covad Comm’ns Grp., Inc., No. 20481-NC, 2004 WL 187274, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 
2004) (“A Section 220 action is not a substitute for discovery under the rules of civil 
procedure.”). 
 160. See generally 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
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questions, comments. There are people in the room substantially smarter 
than me, and I would love to hear your thoughts about this interesting area 
of our law. 
I do, by the way, think everything is going to be okay. 
